Correcting The New York Times spin machine on the 2017 Zika outbreak in Cuba

Setting the paper of record straight

The New York Times spin machine is working over time trying to cover up the fact that healthcare in Cuba is a disaster.  In a August 22, 2019 article by Carl Zimmer, "Zika Was Soaring Across Cuba. Few Outside the Country Knew", the newspaper tries to shift the blame for an unreported outbreak of Zika in Cuba in 2017 on a reporting glitch. This ignores a decades long government pattern of covering up epidemics.

"Until now, the Pan American Health Organization had no record of any Zika infection in Cuba in 2017, much less an outbreak. Following inquiries by The New York Times about the new study, published in the journal Cell, officials acknowledged that they had failed to tally 1,384 cases reported by Cuban officials that year. [...] Officials at P.A.H.O., an arm of the World Health Organization, blamed the failure to publish timely data on the Cuba outbreak on a “technical glitch.” The information was held in a database, they said, but not visible on the website. By Thursday afternoon, the website had been updated."

On August 25, 2016 this blog raised concerns about the reporting on Zika in Cuba. This was done by looking back at past Castro regime responses to previous epidemics, and expressed skepticism of reporting that claimed their was nothing to worry about.

Daniel Chang of the Miami Herald reported on August 17, 2016 in the article "How Cuba is fighting Zika" in the first paragraph a claim that should raise concerns:

"After Cuba was ravaged in 1981 by an epidemic of hemorrhagic dengue fever — a mosquito-borne illness — the island nation’s communist government launched an aggressive response that created the framework for its reportedly successful fight against Zika, according to an article published Wednesday in the scientific journal Nature."

Tragically, the so-called aggressive response to dengue by 1997 involved arresting at least one doctor for enemy propaganda who correctly warned of a Dengue outbreak.  Eventually when the bodies started to pile up, it was no longer possible to cover up the epidemic, and the regime admitted it had a problem. This pattern of denial and lack of transparency was repeated with a cholera outbreak in 2012.

On September 2, 2016 this blog again warned about the dangers of Zika and Associated Press reports that Cuba had "remarkable success in containing Zika virus." This report made no mention of the regime's past history of covering up epidemics on the island.

On January 8, 2019 New Scientist reported: "Cuba failed to report thousands of Zika virus cases in 2017," but this blog added that New Scientist had "forgot to mention that Havana failed to report outbreaks of Dengue (1997) and Cholera (2012). Jailing those who warned the world of the threat.

Reality of Cuba's healthcare system

Cuba has a two tiered health care system one tier for the nomenklatura and foreign tourists with hard currency that offers care with modern equipment and fully stocked pharmacies, then there is a second tier which is for the rest with broken down equipment, run down buildings and rooms, scarce supplies, a lack of hygiene, the denial of certain services and lengthy wait times. Healthcare professionals are poorly paid and lack food.

In 1997 a Cuban doctor was silenced for warning about a deadly dengue epidemic. Dr Desi Mendoza Rivero, married with four children at the time, was arrested on June 25, 1997. On November 28, 1997 he was sentenced to eight years in prison for "enemy propaganda." Amnesty International declared Desi a prisoner of conscience and campaigned for his freedom. He was released on November 20, 1998 due to health reasons following the visit of the Spanish Foreign Minister,  under the condition that he go into exile in Spain.  First official report to the World Health Organization of the dengue outbreak was six months after initial identification made by the jailed and later forcibly exiled physician. Mendoza's reports were eventually confirmed. This episode would have a chilling effect on other doctors coming forward.

Three of the victims of exposure and hypothermia at Mazorra in 2010

On January 15, 2010 The New York Times reported the confirmed deaths of at least 20 mental patients at the Psychiatric Hospital in Cuba, known as Mazorra, due to "criminal negligence by a government characterized by its general inefficiency," a day later the Cuban government confirmed that 26 patients had died due to “prolonged low temperatures that fell to 38 degrees.”

News of a cholera outbreak in Manzanillo, in the east of the island, broke in El Nuevo Herald on June 29, 2012 thanks to the reporting of an independent reporter in the island. Calixto Martinez, the independent Cuban journalist who broke the story was jailed. The state controlled media did not confirm the outbreak until days later on July 3, 2012. The BBC reported on July 7, 2012 that a patient had been diagnosed with Cholera in Havana. The dictatorship stated that it had it under control and on August 28, 2012 said the outbreak was over. 

In July 2013 an Italian tourist returned from Cuba with severe renal failure due to Cholera. New York high school teacher Alfredo Gómez contracted cholera during a family visit to Havana during the summer of 2013 and was billed $4,700 from the government hospital. A total of 12 tourists were identified who had contracted cholera in Cuba.

On August 22, 2013 Reuters reported that Cuba was still struggling with cholera outbreaks in various provinces.  

On December 28, 2017 the Spanish news service EFE reported that the Castro regime had dismantled a network of medical officials and workers who'd adulterated a medicine for children made at the laboratories of the state-owned drug company BioCubaFarma. They replaced the active substance methylphenidate with a placebo substance in the manufacture of the drug marketed as "Ritalin." The active substance was sold on the black market. Nevertheless, the Miami Herald had an article touting the importance of importing drugs from Cuba on December 14, 2017.

The statistics and numbers that the international community has access to with relation to the Cuban healthcare system are manipulated by the dictatorship. Anthropologist Katherine Hirschfeld, in the book she authored, Health, Politics, and Revolution in Cuba Since 1898, describes how her idealistic preconceptions were dashed by 'discrepancies between rhetoric and reality,' she observed a repressive, bureaucratized and secretive system, long on 'militarization' and short on patients' rights.

Mosquitos are the vector for Zika

Conflict of interests? Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the Castro regime's relationship

The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) is being sued for conspiring "with the Cuban government to collect millions of dollars by unlawfully trafficking Cuban doctors to Brazil." (PAHO is the Regional Office for the Americas for the World Health Organization [WHO], and is recognized internationally as a part of the United Nations system.) According to a November 29, 2018 article by Frances Robles, in The New York Times, PAHO "made about $75 million off the work of up to 10,000 Cuban doctors who earned substandard wages in Brazil." 

Perhaps Mr. Zimmer and The New York Times should explore this relationship and the possibility that more than a glitch was involved in endangering the lives of thousands of travelers with the complicity of both the Cuban government and the Pan American Health Organization.

Support the Global Magnitsky Act: Help stop the decline in human rights standards

Take action and turn the tide

Sergei Magnitsky: Prisoner of Conscience who died in custody

 Human rights and fundamental freedoms have been in decline over the past decade. At the same time Western powers have lifted sanctions on repressive regimes, lacking the political will to resist them and hold them accountable. The Supreme Court decision in Crosby versus National Foreign Trade Council (2000) has made the power to issue sanctions solely the domain of the Federal government.  Coinciding with the decline in human rights are growing levels of corruption.

Human rights defenders and friends of freedom have two options: 1) remain passive before these negative trends in despair or 2) do something about it. Bill Browder, founder and CEO of Hermitage Capital Management, confronted with massive rights violations and corruption in Russia did something.

Browder was expelled from Russia in 2005 and officials stole $230 million of taxes from his investment companies that had previously paid. When his lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, investigated the crime, he was arrested by the same officers he implicated, tortured for 358 days, and killed in custody at the age of 37 in November 2009.

 Browder took the case to the United States, and lobbied the US Congress into adopting the ‘Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act’ in 2012, which imposed visa sanctions and asset freezes on those involved in the detention, ill-treatment and death of Sergei Magnitsky. This law was the first time the United States sanctioned Russia in 35 years.

There is an effort underway now  to pass the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which would impose visa sanctions and asset freezes on human rights abusers around the world. Human rights defenders in countries such as Burma, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe should support this legislation.

Time to turn the tide on the decline of human rights around the world. An effective and nonviolent tool to turn things around would be the Global Magnitsky Bill. Reach out to your Congressman and Senator and ask them to back this law.

Badfellas

Wikileaks Reveals: The Cuban Mafia Splinters

CUBA IS A STATE ON THE TAKE


The Cuban mafia was run for decades by the capo known as Fidel Castro, but as the old mafioso has lost his edge and his brother Raul Castro has failed to keep control of the family business one sees that other hands are dipping into the racket known as the Cuban regime.

In a dictatorship where the rule of law is non-existent and subjected to the whims of a small ruling elite corruption is endemic part of that system.

These are bad fellas. In the picture above from (left to right) you've got three of the old mafia guard Ramiro Valdez (a.k.a Blood Bath) , Raul Castro (a.k.a. Fredo) and Fidel Castro (a.k.a. the Horse). The cable below leaked by Wikileaks speaks volumes:

06HAVANA8986 2006-04-26 18:06 2011-01-22 21:09

CONFIDENTIAL US Interests Section Havana

[...]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 008986

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV SOCI ECON CU
SUBJECT: (CUBA IS) A STATE ON THE TAKE

REF: HAVANA 8769

HAVANA 00008986 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: MICHAEL E. PARMLY FOR REASONS 1.4 b/d

¶1. (C) Summary: Castro has spent the past five months battling corruption in a country where trickery has become a way of life. Because most Cubans work for the state, the entire system - from petty officials to Castro's closest advisors - is rife with corrupt practices. Given state control over all resources, corruption and thievery have become one and the same. Corrupt practices also include bribery, misuse of state resources and accounting shenanigans. In its post-Soviet incarnation, Cuba has become a state on the take. End Summary.

From Petty to Grande
--------------------

¶2. (U) In October 2005, Castro embarked on a crusade against corruption that shows no signs of letting up (ref A). The concerted campaign has disrupted the lives of many Cubans living off their abilities to "resolver" (a word that implies everything from simply finding a creative solution to outright stealing). Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, "resolver" has become a way of life in Cuba. Economic desperation combined with totalitarian control has resulted in a state system riddled by corruption from top to bottom.

Bribes
------

¶3. (U) Bribes are a common means of getting around suffocating controls. For example, Cubans are only allowed to swap housing ("permutar") if both residences are of equal value. Money is not allowed to exchange hands in the transaction, but often does. If a Cuban mother swaps a small apartment for a large one in a trade that obviously involved compensation, she must also be prepared to pay a GOC housing official several hundred dollars to look the other way. An additional fee may be required to push the deal through in a timely fashion. As always, Cubans must tread carefully; accidentally propositioning a clean official - or worse, a strident revolutionary - could result in disaster.

¶4. (U) Block organizations (CDRs) have declined in prominence over the years (to the point where few Cubans have any interest in becoming CDR President), but still maintain control over the distribution of goods. On rare occasions, these goods are valuable. When televisions or refrigerators become available through the state system, CDR Officers are famous for giving preferential access to two groups: Those that maintain good revolutionary credentials... and those that can afford it.

¶5. (U) Bribes are also key to getting good jobs (good jobs being those with opportunities to "resolver"). For example, a job with access to a fuel tank (gas station or other outlet) reportedly costs thousands of dollars, while a job in tourism (with access to tips) might cost in the hundreds. An unemployed Cuban told P/E Officer that a job with elite state firm CIMEX (The Import-Export Corporation) would cost him up to 500 USD.

¶6. (U) Cuban police officers are famous for taking bribes. They pull drivers over for myriad transgressions, then describe their "sick child." An Italian tourist told P/E Officer that every time a police officer pulled him over, it was always the officer's "birthday." The police are so corrupt that the GOC regularly fills their ranks with unsullied recruits from the East. As time passes, the new crop becomes as corrupt as the old, and a fresh batch is brought in to replace them.

Misuse of State Resources
-------------------------

¶7. (U) Cash is not abundant in Cuba, such that bribes sometimes take a back seat to bartering, exchanging favors, and "tit for tat" deals. A Cuban might not enjoy control over anything easily stolen or sold on the black market, but putting resources to other uses can be lucrative. Transportation is a prime example. As every Cuban knows, anyone behind the wheel of a state vehicle (whether truck, bus, car or train) earns two incomes: a
HAVANA 00008986 002.2 OF 003
pittance from the state, plus additional income transporting people or goods on the side. In another example, a Cuban woman told P/E officer how she finally managed to get her tooth capped successfully by paying hard currency at an underground dental clinic, staffed by health ministry dentists and outfitted with equipment stolen from the state.

¶8. (U) Certain sectors, including shipping, tourism, construction and food are notorious for generalized theft and corruption. For example, there is a thriving black market in cement, paint and wood. Or as one Cuban commented (in response to Vice President Carlos Lage's 2005 promise to build 10,000 new housing units), "the GOC can't build anything because it is simply impossible to collect enough supplies in one place." The ration system, which leaves bulk foods under the supervision of bodega employees, is also notorious for theft and corruption. As mentioned above, the housing office, or "Vivienda," is also famous for corruption.

¶9. (U) In Cuba's so-called "productive" sectors, much wheeling and dealing goes on behind the scenes as state managers swap goods, concoct inventories, fabricate receipts, and deal in imaginary resources. They are aided by an accounting system that equates the Cuban Peso (CP) with the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC) on paper, though the real exchange rate is 26 to 1. (For example, some official state purchases are made in CUCs while others are made in CPs.) To aid in the confusion, Cuban managers and accountants still track their accounts with paper and pencils. The resulting morass of numbers is so incomprehensible that even "clean" managers are forced to play accounting tricks in order to do their jobs.

¶10. (U) Some state installations are run by de facto "mafias." One Cuban told P/E officer about the manager of a bread distribution center who put his friends in key jobs. He eventually came to control an entire chain of state bakeries.

Power and Position
------------------

¶11. (C) The GOC stopped giving licenses to new paladars (home-based restaurants) several years ago, raising questions as to what the remaining operations had done to stay open. An American specialist on the topic posited that all upscale paladars were in some way "connected." For example, a USINT officer outside the XXXXXXXXXXXX paladar XXXXXXXXXXXX spotted the supposedly "self-employed" owner drive up in a car with Ministry of the Interior (MININT) plates. A one-table paladar in the Santa Fe neighborhood (known as the "fish paladar") reportedly enjoys an elite clientele - Raul Castro. In these days of heightened state control, merely bribing inspectors is not enough to stay open.

¶12. (U) The benefits of holding a position of power within the GOC can be lucrative. A Swiss businessman told P/E officer that Cuban managers take kickbacks for awarding large contracts to foreign companies and then deposit those kickbacks in banks abroad. "Just like everywhere in the world, a million dollar contract gets you 100,000 in the bank," he commented. These state managers are not so much members of the revolutionary elite, but rather pragmatists who have carved out a space for themselves within an otherwise rigid system. The former head of the Tourism Ministry might serve as an example - he was dismissed in 2004 due to "serious mistakes relating to control" and replaced with a military general.

¶13. (C) Separate from this elite crowd of entrepreneurs stand Castro's cadres of regime faithfuls, some of whom are widely rumored to be corrupt (such as Castro clan insider General Julio Casas Regueiro). Last year, Battle of Ideas Head Otto Rivero (a Castro protege) almost lost his job due to a corruption scandal. Battle of Ideas personnel were rumored to be dipping into the pie at all levels, from accounting shenanigans to making off with food and television sets destined for the "Free the Five" campaign.

Comment
-------

¶14. (C) Because the state controls - or tries to control -
HAVANA 00008986 003.2 OF 003
all aspects of life in Cuba, theft and corruption have become one and the same. The hotel manager who appropriates foodstuffs is both corrupt (he uses his state job for personal gain) and a thief (he steals). The more corruption grows, the more Castro tightens control, and the more Cubans turn to corruption to get what they want. The GOC leadership is well aware of the problem, but Castro can't seem to make peace with it. As one local diplomat ruminated, "Castro leads a saintly life, but saints are special because they are rare." And so the Comandante continues his struggle to wipe out corruption, seemingly oblivious to its irreversibility as long as profitable activity is illegal, individual success is cause for suspicion, and old-fashioned hard work gets you nowhere.

PARMLY